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Abstract: In a laboratory experiment designed to test aspiration-based theories of happiness,
McBride (2010) found no evidence of the predicted negative effect of own past payments on
subjects’ satisfaction with their current round payments. This paper presents further analysis of
McBride’s data that reveals such an effect. In the treatment where such an effect is most likely to
be observed, subjects’ satisfaction with their payments in a given round is negatively affected by
the level of payment they received the last time they faced the same payment probabilities. The
overall trajectory of their payments when facing the same payment probabilities is also found to
have an effect.
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1. Introduction
In 2010, Michael McBride presented the results from the first experimental study into how
own past payments, the payments received by others, and payment expectations affect subjects’
reported satisfaction with current payments. His analysis of the experimental data revealed that,
in accordance with aspiration-based theories of happiness, payment expectations and the
payments received by others impact negatively on individuals’ satisfaction with their own
current payments. However, the analysis revealed no evidence that own past payments impact
negatively on satisfaction. This null finding is at odds with both aspiration-based theories of
happiness and the findings from previous survey-based studies focusing on income. With the aim
of reconciling his analysis with the theory and survey-based evidence McBride stated that
“subjects are unlikely to become too accustomed to prior payoffs during the duration of a
relatively short experiment” (McBride 2010, p.263) and thereby brought the external validity of
both his own experiment and any future experiments aiming to investigate aspiration-based
theories of happiness and adaptation into question.
In this paper, after summarizing McBride’s experimental design (section 2), I develop two
conjectures as to why McBride’s analysis did not reveal a negative effect of own past payments
on satisfaction (section 3). One of these conjectures states that the predicted negative effect is
likely to be hard to find in McBride’s data, especially in the more complicated treatments. The
other states that the negative effect might be present but conditional. Seeing the first conjecture
as a justification for further analysis and the testing of the second as a suitable objective for that
analysis, I contacted McBride and asked if I could have his data. McBride graciously agreed. The
results of this further analysis are presented below (section 4). They show that own past
payments do have a negative effect on subjects’ satisfaction with their current payments, but
only when those past payments were received when facing similar payment probabilities to those
currently faced. Further, not only the last payment received when facing similar payment
probabilities but also the trajectory of such payments over all prior rounds has an effect.
These new findings have important implications for the way we view McBride’s experiment.
They suggest that it may have greater external validity than McBride himself concluded; even
within the short timeframe of a laboratory-based experiment McBride captured (while leaving a
latecomer to render observable) subjects becoming accustomed to levels of and even trajectories
in the levels of payments received. These new findings also have important implications for
behavioral experiments in general, especially those involving repeated rounds, as they suggest
that individual reference points are endogenous to experiences within lab sessions.
2. McBride’s experimental design
McBride’s experiment involved 25 rounds of a matching pennies game. In each round each
subject was randomly matched with one of five computer partner-types: 20 percent heads-80
percent tails; 35 percent heads-65 percent tails; 50 percent heads-50 percent tails; 65 percent
heads-35 percent tails; 80 percent heads-20 percent tails. Each partner-type was equally likely.3
Each subject was told her partner-type at the start of the round and then had to indicate whether
she thought the first, second, third, fourth and fifth of five coins randomly selected by the
computer were going to be a head or a tail. Then the computer randomly and independently
selected heads or tails according to the partner-type distribution. If the subject's first coin and the
computer's first coin matched (either both heads or both tails), the subject won the coin, and so
on for the other four coins. Thus, a subject could win between zero to 5 coins in any given round.
Once all the choices and draws were complete, the subject learned the number of coins won by
her in the round. In Treatment A, the subject was told only the number of coins won by her in the
round. In Treatment B, the subject was told both the number of coins won by her and the average
number of coins won by other subjects in the round. In Treatment C, the subject was told the
number of coins won by her, the average number of coins won by other subjects facing the 20-80
partner-types, the average number of coins won by other subjects facing the 35-60 partner-types,
and the average number of coins won by other subjects facing the 50-50 partner-type.
Immediately after this, the subject was asked "How satisfied are you with the result of this
round?" She then reported her satisfaction on a scale of 1-7, with 1 signifying "very dissatisfied,"
4 signifying "satisfied," and 7 signifying "very satisfied." Then, the next round began.
Treatments A, B, and C were assigned to 36, 32, and 36 subjects, respectively. Payments were
calculated using an exchange rate of 8 coins for 1 dollar. Sessions lasted approximately 1 hour
and the average total take-home pay was approximately $17.
3. Why no evidence of a negative effect of past own payments on satisfaction with current
round payment?
First, consider the sequence of events leading up to and including the elicitation of the
subjects’ level of satisfaction in each round. In Treatment A, the subjects found out their
computer partner-type and hence, in principle, the objective expected payment for the round.
Then they made their choices and found out their own payment for the round. Finally they
reported their level of satisfaction. Note that information about all of their own past payments
was received prior to this entire sequence of events.
1 So, if when constructing a reference point
or aspiration an individual gives more weight to information received more recently, we would
expect own past payments to be given less weight than the objective expectation and current own
payment. In Treatment B, another piece of information, namely the average payment to others
for the round, was received at the same time as they found out their own payment for the round,
possibly reducing the weight assigned to information about own past payments relative to
Treatment A. Finally, in Treatment C, three other pieces of information, namely the average
payment to others facing each of the three possible sets of payment probabilities, was received at
the same time as they found out their own payment for the round, possibly reducing the weight
1 All of their own past payments were either visible on the computer screen or, in the case of much earlier rounds,
could be made visible by scrolling. However, this data accumulated on the screen rather than being re-received prior
to the reporting of satisfaction with any given round.4
assigned to information about own past payments even further. This reasoning leads to the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 1: the sequencing of events in the experiment may have reduced the likelihood of
identifying a negative effect of own past payments on satisfaction with current payment,
especially in Treatments B and C.
This conjecture cannot be tested using McBride’s data. However, it can be viewed as a
justification for undertaking further analysis of McBride’s data. Further, in principle at least, the
differential likelihood of finding the effect across treatments can be explored.
Second, McBride found that in Treatment C a subject’s satisfaction with her own current
payment was negatively affected by the average payment received by others facing the same
partner-type, i.e., the same payment probabilities, and not by the average payment received by
others facing different partner-types. However, McBride did not investigate whether a similar
type of conditioning was applied to own past payments. Thus, it seems reasonable to investigate
the following conjecture:
Conjecture 2: subjects’ satisfaction with their own current payments is negatively affected by
their own past payments when facing the same partner-type.
In the next section I present the results of a test of Conjecture 2 based on the data from
McBride’s Treatment A. Then I consider Conjecture 1 by reporting what happens when the
analysis is extended to Treatments B and C.
4. Results
Column 1 of Table 1 presents a linear regression analysis conducted and presented by
McBride.
2 This regression focuses on Treatment A only. It takes the subject’s level of
satisfaction with the round as the dependent variable and the round number (Round), the
subject’s payment (in coins won) for that round (Payment), the expected payment for a subject
making the expected payment maximizing choices in that round (Exp. payment-max), the
subject’s payment (in coins won) in the previous round (Prior round payment), and the subject’s
average payment (in coins won) across all prior rounds (Avg. payment through prior rounds) as
independent variables. There are 24 observations, one corresponding to each round in the
experiment excluding the first, for each of the 36 subjects giving a total of 864. The regression
accounts for subject fixed effects. Note the insignificant coefficients on Prior round payment and
Avg. payment through prior rounds.
In column 2 Prior round payment and Avg. payment through prior rounds are replaced with
the payment the subject received when she last faced the same partner-type, i.e., the same
payment probabilities (Payment in last round with same type).
3 This new variable bears a
2 See McBride (2010) page 270, Table 2, column “II-A” (the fourth column of figures).
3 The mean for this new variable is 3.262 and its standard deviation is 1.142.5
negative coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level.
4 The coefficient is small; for every
additional coin they won during their last meeting with the same partner-type their satisfaction
with their current win is only 0.065 points lower. It is less than one fifth of the size of the effect
of the objective expectation. However, the effect is identified and it is well defined.
Table 1
Linear regression analyses of McBride's data
Dependent variable = level of satisfaction with round
1 2 3
Constant 1.325 *** 1.335 *** 1.237 **
(0.468) (0.420) (0.464)
Round -0.011 * -0.011 -0.013
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Payment 1.420 *** 1.388 *** 1.315 ***
(0.083) (0.093) (0.116)
Exp. payment-max -0.482 *** -0.381 *** -0.339 ***
(0.100) (0.102) (0.124)
Prior round payment 0.0003
(0.038)
Avg. payment through prior rounds 0.017
(0.034)
Payment in last round with same type -0.065 **
(0.026)
Decline in payment between last round with same type -0.071 *
and current round (0.041)
Trajectory across rounds with same type -0.129
(0.096)
Decline x Trajectory -0.118 ***
(0.043)
R-squared (overall) 0.68 0.67 0.65
R-squared (within) 0.75 0.73 0.74
Observations 864 721 546
Notes: Data generated experimentally by McBride (2010); standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted to
account for correlation within individuals; subject fixed effects are included in all regressions; sample for
regression in column 1 omits the first round of the experiment; sample for regression in columns 2 and 3 also omits
cases where subject is meeting a specific partner-type for the first time; sample for regression in column 3 also
omits cases where subject is meeting a specific partner-type for the second time; * - significant at 10 percent level;
** - significant at 5 percent level; *** - significant at 1 percent level.
In column 3 I push the analysis a step further by replacing Payment in last round with same
type with Decline in payment between last round with same type and current round, Trajectory
across previous rounds with same type, and the interaction between these two variables. The
variable Decline in payment between last round with same type and current round (the Decline
4 Note that this regression was run on a smaller sample than McBride’s regression in column 1. This is because, in
earlier rounds especially, not all subjects had had a prior meeting with the same partner-type. If McBride’s
specification is run on this restricted sample almost identical (to McBride’s) results are returned. In particular,
neither Prior round payment nor Avg. payment through prior rounds bears a significant coefficient.6
variable) equals the payment that a subject received the last time they faced the partner-type they
are facing again in the current round minus the payment they receive for the current round.
5
Trajectory across previous rounds with same type (the Trajectory variable) is the estimated slope
coefficient from a linear regression that takes a subject’s payoffs in all previous rounds in which
they faced the same partner-type, i.e., the same payment probabilities, as the dependent variable
and the round number as the only right-hand side variable. A total of 2,726 such regressions were
run. Approximately 30 percent of these regressions were conducted on two observations and, so,
were not strictly regressions even though they yielded slope coefficients. The estimated
coefficients varied between minus two and plus five.
6 Only 10.7 percent of the coefficients were
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
7
The inclusion of the Trajectory variable and its interaction with the Decline variable
represents a departure from standard aspiration-based theories of happiness. It allows us to look
at whether individual reference points are conditioned not only on levels in past experiences but
also on the dynamics or trajectories of those past experiences. Consider, for example, two
individuals who receive the same incomes as each other in times ݐand ݐ൅ ͳ, with the income
in ݐ൅ ͳ being lower than the income in ݐ . These two individuals are identical in all respects
except that for one the fall represents a continuation of an ongoing decline in income, while for
the other it follows the end of a period of income growth. According to standard aspiration-based
theories of happiness, if both individuals had adapted to their income level in ݐ , they would both
be equally unhappy with the fall in income in ݐ൅ ͳ. Further, if they had not fully adapted to their
income level in ݐ , the individual whose income was growing just prior to ݐ would be less
unhappy as the fall would be more likely to represent a return to a recently experienced level of
income. However, if individual aspirations are more like projections along the current trend than
projections assuming stasis, the individual whose income was growing just prior to ݐwould be
more unhappy as the fall would lead to a greater divergence between aspiration and reality. To
study such a phenomenon using survey data would require a panel of greater length than is
currently available. However, McBride’s data spans 25 time periods, thereby providing a unique
opportunity to look at the impact of past trajectories on aspiration formation.
In column 3 the coefficient on the Trajectory variable is not significant.
8 However, the
interaction between the Trajectory and the Decline variable bears a negative coefficient that is
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on the uninteracted Decline variable is also
5 Note that a model that included only Decline in payment between last round with same type and current round in
place of Payment in last round with same type would be structurally equivalent to the model in column 2. When
such a model is estimated the Decline variable bears a significant negative coefficient.
6 The mean was 0.012 and the standard deviation across the sample of 2,726 slopes was 0.464.
7 Of course, such a regression can only be run if a subject has met the partner-type she now faces twice before and
this restricts the sample and causes later rounds to be overrepresented even more. If the specification presented in
column 2 is run on this even more severely restricted sample the coefficient on Payment in last round with same
type changes to -0.092 but remains significant at 5 percent. If McBride’s specification is run on this even more
restricted sample, once again, neither Prior round payment nor Avg. payment through prior rounds bears a
significant coefficient.
8 When the Trajectory variable is included and the Decline variable and interaction term are not, the Trajectory
variable bears a significant (at 5 percent) negative coefficient.7
negative and significant at the 10 percent level. Taken together, the two significant coefficients
indicate that the dissatisfaction associated with a decline in payment across consecutive meetings
with the same partner-type in McBride’s experiment is greater the more upwardly inclined the
trajectory of payments over all prior meetings with that partner-type.
To assist with the interpretation of these coefficients, Figure 1. presents four possible
scenarios that a subject could have experienced leading up to a win of 3 coins in round 12 of the
experiment (left-hand panel) and the subject’s satisfaction with that win of 3 coins (right-hand
panel) predicted using the model presented in column 3 of Table 1. The scenario involving an
increase in payment over prior rounds when facing the same type up to round 11 and then a
decline between round 11 and round 12 (Scenario 4: increase-and-then-decline-to-3-coins) yields
an observably and, according to an F-test, significantly lower level of satisfaction compared to
the scenarios in which the subject experiences an increase in payment between rounds 11 and 12
(Scenario 1: decline-and-then-increase-to-3-coins, and Scenario 2: carry-on-increasing-to-3-
coins) or a continued decline (Scenario 3: carry-on-declining-to-3-coins). The difference in
satisfaction level between Scenario 4, increase-and-then-decline-to-3-coins, and the other
scenarios is one quarter of a point on the seven point scale, smaller but similar in order of
magnitude to the effect of a one coin decline in the objective expectation (-0.339 in the same
model). Thus, McBride’s data reveals that when constructing their payment aspirations
experimental subjects adapt not only to recently experienced payment levels but also to payment
trajectories.
Fig. 1. Predicted effects of different payment trajectories on
subject satisfaction with current round payment
Notes: In the text: Scenario 1 is also referred to as the decline-and-then-increase-to-3-coins scenario; Scenario 2
as the carry-on-increasing-to-3-coins scenario; Scenario 3 as the carry-on-declining-to-3-coins scenario: and
Scenario 4 as the increase-and-then-decline-to-3-coins scenario.
In the analysis of the data from McBride’s Treatments B and C, when either Payment in last
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the two is used in place of Prior round payment and Avg. payment through prior rounds, they all
bear insignificant coefficients (see Table 2). This is consistent with Conjecture 1 above.
Table 2
Linear regression analyses of McBride's Treatment B and Treatment C data
Dependent variable = level of satisfaction with round
Notes: Data generated experimentally by Michael McBride, regressions in columns 1 and 4 are as presented in
McBride (2010); standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted to account for correlation within individuals;
subject fixed effects are included in all regressions; sample for regression in columns 1 and 4 omit the first round of
the respective experimental sessions; samples for regressions in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 also omit cases where subject
is meeting a specific partner type for the first time; sample for regressions in columns 3 and 6 also omit cases where
subject is meeting a specific partner type for the second time; * - significant at 10 percent level; ** - significant at 5
percent level; *** - significant at 1 percent level.9
5. Discussion
That within McBride’s experiment, own past payments when facing the same partner-type
negatively affect satisfaction with current own payment indicates that experimental subjects do
become accustomed to prior payoffs even within one-hour-long laboratory experiments. Thus, it
seems that McBride’s experiment may have greater external validity than McBride himself
concluded.
However, it is important to bear in mind that, like the social comparison effect identified in
McBride’s original analysis, the hedonic treadmill effect revealed here relates only to
experiences when facing the same payment probabilities. In the case of the social comparison
effect, this does not appear strange as it corresponds quite nicely to the finding in the survey-
based literature that people compare themselves to similar others (variably defined). That the
hedonic treadmill effect might be conditioned on the similarity between the current and past own
contexts does not correspond in the same way to a finding in the survey-based literature.
However, given how early we are in the analysis of this phenomenon, it would seem
inappropriate to treat this as evidence of external invalidity. Rather, it should be viewed as a
motivator for further research both within and outside the lab.
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that the predicted negative effect of own past
payments was observed in only one of the three treatments applied by McBride. This differential
effect also needs further investigation as it suggests that even apparently trivial details of
experimental design could affect the conclusions drawn.
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